ID :
39538
Thu, 01/08/2009 - 20:50
Auther :
Shortlink :
http://m.oananews.org//node/39538
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NORTH KOREA NEWSLETTER NO. 36 (January 8, 2008)
*** OPINION FROM EXPERTS
NORTH KOREA'S SOUTH KOREA POLICY: EVALUATION AND PROSPECTS
By Jinwook Choi
Senior Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification, Seoul, Korea
Since the launch of the Lee Myung-bak administration in February 2008, North
Korea has heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula. A series of events since
President Lee's inauguration culminated in the partial suspension of inter-Korean
traffic to Kaesong on Dec. 1. Leaflet launches by South Korean citizens, the
South's proposal of a North Korean human rights resolution, and its disputes over
the North's compliance with the June 15 Joint Declaration and the Oct. 4
Declaration were denounced by Pyongyang.
While during the first half of this year, North Korea's offensive amounted to
verbal criticism, toward the latter half of 2008, its behavior turned to more
aggressive tactics. As the Beijing Olympics drew to a close, food shortage
conditions in North Korea improved, and the DPRK (North Korea) was removed from
the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, North Korea was encouraged to make
bold moves. In addition to its attacks on the Lee administration's DPRK policy,
it shifted to direct criticism of the South Korean government, using the
anti-U.S. beef protests and unstable economic environment as opportune timing for
censure. Instead of abruptly shutting out all inter-Korean relations, North Korea
chose to gradually reduce inter-Korean ties, thereby escalating tension. However,
it appears it is also afraid of complete severance from the South.
Assessment for 2008
The three biggest issues that influenced North Korea's policy toward the South in
2008 were: 1) Kim Jong-il's health, 2) the nuclear weapons program, and 3) the
launch of the Lee Myung-bak administration. North Korea's ROK (South Korea)
offensive seems to have several intentions. First, Pyongyang not only wanted to
corner the Lee administration so it would change its stated hard-line position
toward North Korea, but it also hoped for an opportunity to render it weak and
helpless. Owing to the victory of U.S. President-elect Barack Obama, the
progressive faction within South Korea was encouraged, and appropriately, North
Korea was able to concentrate on solidarity with progressive U.S. and South
Korean factions, which had flagged due to issues such as the death of a tourist
in Mount Kumgang, the North Korean female spy case, and rumors of Kim Jong-il's
poor health. Thus, the DPRK sought to denounce the leaflet launches and blame
South Korea for cooled inter-Korean relations, meanwhile emphasizing the
fulfillment the of June 15 and Oct. 4 declarations and garnering support from the
South's progressives. North Korea has vehemently denied responsibility for the
inter-Korean blockade.
Second, the North Korea's offensive reflects its desperate state of affairs.
North Korea benefits from several forms of economic cooperation with South Korea,
such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex (US$20-30 million), the Mount Kumgang
tourist venture ($20-30 million), humanitarian assistance ($150 million),
commercial trade ($300-400 million), etc. Of these, bilateral commercial trade is
the most significant; however, signs of a shift toward decreasing trade have
alarmed North Korea. Thus, in order to prevent losses from inter-Korean trade,
the DPRK has decided to use the Kaesong industrial complex as a means to protect
its commercial trade. Realistically speaking, without any headway in nuclear
dismantlement, resuming the Mount Kumgang tours will be difficult, and needless
to say, realizing the June 15 Joint Declaration and the Oct. 4 Declaration and
further expansion of the Kaesong industrial complex will be impossible. These
factors have pushed the North to take a hard-line approach. Meanwhile, shutting
down the Kaesong industrial complex will be equivalent to cutting all ties with
the South, and in that case, Pyongyang should take into consideration that it
will have to shoulder immense economic costs. Furthermore, North Korea cannot
overlook the social costs and complaints coming from over 100,000 North Korean
Kaesong workers and their families.
Third, North Korea's offensive aims to drive a wedge between Seoul and
Washington. Pyongyang has concentrated on attacking the Lee administration in
order to incite conflict between the South and the U.S. For instance, Pyongyang
believes it can damage the Lee administration's cooperation with the U.S. on
"CONPLAN 5029," as well as weaken the South's intervention in U.S.-DPRK
relations.
Fourth, North Korea's hard-line diplomacy toward South Korea is for the sake of
domestic unity. Since the end of 2006, North Korea has enforced control over
society in order to preserve internal solidarity, and this requires a certain
level of external pressure. For example, DPRK markets supervise female market
workers who are younger than 45 years of age, and starting Jan. 1, 2009, it will
restrict market activity to three times a month. Furthermore, the government is
taking measures to strictly regulate the release of grain from cooperative farms
in order to restore the rationing system. It has also held a conference for party
cell secretaries and a conference for intellectuals, as well as strengthened the
central party's intensive censorship in order to tighten government control.
These regulations have roused complaints from North Korean citizens, but even to
relieve them of this pressure external, tension must be present. Since the
deterioration of Kim Jong-il's health, the North Korean elites need to
demonstrate loyalty to him by taking a hard-line approach.
Looking Ahead to 2009
For the moment, North Korea's containment policy toward the South will continue,
and heighten tension in phases as the DPRK uses its "salami" tactic. However,
rather than completely cut ties with South Korea, Pyongyang will most likely use
a series of familiar brinksmanship strategies up until the point of severing
inter-Korean relations. It will be difficult for North Korea to completely break
ties with the South, given the international circumstances and environment.
First, restoring inter-Korean relations will be a tricky and time-consuming
process, and the slightest error could cause an avalanche of negative impact on
North-South trade relations.
Second, adverse public opinion in the South could give rise to a aggressive
countermeasures, and third, it could have a negative effect on U.S.-DPRK relations.
However, if relations with the U.S. come to ruins, North Korea will spring back more
aggressively. North Korea may completely shut down the Kaesong industrial complex,
and it will be tough to eliminate the possibility of a DPRK military provocation,
nuclear weapons tests, and missile firings.
Several factors could influence North Korea's approach hereafter, namely:
tangible progress in U.S.-DPRK relations, the worsening domestic economy, and a
turnover in the Lee administration's DPRK policy. Regarding the first, while a
sudden advance in the nuclear weapons conflict is not foreseeable, mutual visits
by high-ranking officials and steady development in nuclear dismantlement can
improve U.S.-DPRK bilateral relations. The North's objective is not only to
obtain a security guarantee from the U.S., but also to remove barriers to
attaining economic assistance. Therefore, there is a high chance of proactive
interaction with the South after substantial progress in the denuclearization
process. North Korea may also apply pressure to South Korea by taking a more
concessive stance on the kidnapping issue and initiate talks with Japan.
Second, despite the increase in crop production this year, due to new regulations
of market activity made in an effort to revive the food distribution system,
North Korea may face mass starvation in 2009 in some areas. If distribution is
not effective and markets are debilitated, it will be challenging to supply food
for the general civilian population. I suspect that North Korea's famine is
impacted more by the government's public distribution system than by the gross
quantity of food. If Pyongyang decides to close the Kaesong complex, it is not
hard to predict a flood of complaints and grievances from the North Korean
workers and their families.
Third, the Lee administration's policy toward North Korea will have the most
impact on North Korea's outlook on the ROK. South Korea needs to encourage
Pyongyang to change its stubborn attitude.
2009 Strategic Vision
If we retain this "neglect strategy" for DPRK policy until the first half of next
year, we must not give the impression we are completely neglecting the North, and
we must continue efforts to restore inter-Korean dialogue. We must refrain from
making provocative comments and sustain the volition to achieve North-South
dialogue. At the moment, South Korea's domestic environment and continuing
international collaboration efforts are more pressing than North Korea's own
problems. If there is an incremental buildup of tension from the DPRK and the
nature of U.S.-DPRK dialogue improves after President-elect Obama steps into
office, there is a possibility that the progressive faction will criticize the
Lee administration and cause internal conflict.
In case North Korea feels the need to improve North-South relations and receives
such pressure after the first half of 2009, we must create a preparation
handbook. Especially because of the rumors of Kim Jong-il's poor health,
inter-Korean dialogue is increasingly necessary. The public may expect improved
inter-Korean relations after the first year if hostile relations with North Korea
continue.
We should offer North Korea the right incentives and rationale to step out of its
hermit state and communicate with Seoul, and insist on a plan that transforms the
character of inter-Korean negotiations. No matter what dire straits North Korea
finds itself in, there is a very small possibility that it will yield. We should
work toward realizing a method of negotiation that unites the goals of bringing
both change inside North Korea and giving humanitarian assistance. We must work
toward enforcing the monitoring of the allocation of humanitarian aid, promote
the business practices of the Kaesong industrial complex and the Mount Kumgang
tourism venture, and improve the transparency of inter-Korean businesses in
compliance with international standards.
(END)
NORTH KOREA'S SOUTH KOREA POLICY: EVALUATION AND PROSPECTS
By Jinwook Choi
Senior Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification, Seoul, Korea
Since the launch of the Lee Myung-bak administration in February 2008, North
Korea has heightened tension on the Korean Peninsula. A series of events since
President Lee's inauguration culminated in the partial suspension of inter-Korean
traffic to Kaesong on Dec. 1. Leaflet launches by South Korean citizens, the
South's proposal of a North Korean human rights resolution, and its disputes over
the North's compliance with the June 15 Joint Declaration and the Oct. 4
Declaration were denounced by Pyongyang.
While during the first half of this year, North Korea's offensive amounted to
verbal criticism, toward the latter half of 2008, its behavior turned to more
aggressive tactics. As the Beijing Olympics drew to a close, food shortage
conditions in North Korea improved, and the DPRK (North Korea) was removed from
the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, North Korea was encouraged to make
bold moves. In addition to its attacks on the Lee administration's DPRK policy,
it shifted to direct criticism of the South Korean government, using the
anti-U.S. beef protests and unstable economic environment as opportune timing for
censure. Instead of abruptly shutting out all inter-Korean relations, North Korea
chose to gradually reduce inter-Korean ties, thereby escalating tension. However,
it appears it is also afraid of complete severance from the South.
Assessment for 2008
The three biggest issues that influenced North Korea's policy toward the South in
2008 were: 1) Kim Jong-il's health, 2) the nuclear weapons program, and 3) the
launch of the Lee Myung-bak administration. North Korea's ROK (South Korea)
offensive seems to have several intentions. First, Pyongyang not only wanted to
corner the Lee administration so it would change its stated hard-line position
toward North Korea, but it also hoped for an opportunity to render it weak and
helpless. Owing to the victory of U.S. President-elect Barack Obama, the
progressive faction within South Korea was encouraged, and appropriately, North
Korea was able to concentrate on solidarity with progressive U.S. and South
Korean factions, which had flagged due to issues such as the death of a tourist
in Mount Kumgang, the North Korean female spy case, and rumors of Kim Jong-il's
poor health. Thus, the DPRK sought to denounce the leaflet launches and blame
South Korea for cooled inter-Korean relations, meanwhile emphasizing the
fulfillment the of June 15 and Oct. 4 declarations and garnering support from the
South's progressives. North Korea has vehemently denied responsibility for the
inter-Korean blockade.
Second, the North Korea's offensive reflects its desperate state of affairs.
North Korea benefits from several forms of economic cooperation with South Korea,
such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex (US$20-30 million), the Mount Kumgang
tourist venture ($20-30 million), humanitarian assistance ($150 million),
commercial trade ($300-400 million), etc. Of these, bilateral commercial trade is
the most significant; however, signs of a shift toward decreasing trade have
alarmed North Korea. Thus, in order to prevent losses from inter-Korean trade,
the DPRK has decided to use the Kaesong industrial complex as a means to protect
its commercial trade. Realistically speaking, without any headway in nuclear
dismantlement, resuming the Mount Kumgang tours will be difficult, and needless
to say, realizing the June 15 Joint Declaration and the Oct. 4 Declaration and
further expansion of the Kaesong industrial complex will be impossible. These
factors have pushed the North to take a hard-line approach. Meanwhile, shutting
down the Kaesong industrial complex will be equivalent to cutting all ties with
the South, and in that case, Pyongyang should take into consideration that it
will have to shoulder immense economic costs. Furthermore, North Korea cannot
overlook the social costs and complaints coming from over 100,000 North Korean
Kaesong workers and their families.
Third, North Korea's offensive aims to drive a wedge between Seoul and
Washington. Pyongyang has concentrated on attacking the Lee administration in
order to incite conflict between the South and the U.S. For instance, Pyongyang
believes it can damage the Lee administration's cooperation with the U.S. on
"CONPLAN 5029," as well as weaken the South's intervention in U.S.-DPRK
relations.
Fourth, North Korea's hard-line diplomacy toward South Korea is for the sake of
domestic unity. Since the end of 2006, North Korea has enforced control over
society in order to preserve internal solidarity, and this requires a certain
level of external pressure. For example, DPRK markets supervise female market
workers who are younger than 45 years of age, and starting Jan. 1, 2009, it will
restrict market activity to three times a month. Furthermore, the government is
taking measures to strictly regulate the release of grain from cooperative farms
in order to restore the rationing system. It has also held a conference for party
cell secretaries and a conference for intellectuals, as well as strengthened the
central party's intensive censorship in order to tighten government control.
These regulations have roused complaints from North Korean citizens, but even to
relieve them of this pressure external, tension must be present. Since the
deterioration of Kim Jong-il's health, the North Korean elites need to
demonstrate loyalty to him by taking a hard-line approach.
Looking Ahead to 2009
For the moment, North Korea's containment policy toward the South will continue,
and heighten tension in phases as the DPRK uses its "salami" tactic. However,
rather than completely cut ties with South Korea, Pyongyang will most likely use
a series of familiar brinksmanship strategies up until the point of severing
inter-Korean relations. It will be difficult for North Korea to completely break
ties with the South, given the international circumstances and environment.
First, restoring inter-Korean relations will be a tricky and time-consuming
process, and the slightest error could cause an avalanche of negative impact on
North-South trade relations.
Second, adverse public opinion in the South could give rise to a aggressive
countermeasures, and third, it could have a negative effect on U.S.-DPRK relations.
However, if relations with the U.S. come to ruins, North Korea will spring back more
aggressively. North Korea may completely shut down the Kaesong industrial complex,
and it will be tough to eliminate the possibility of a DPRK military provocation,
nuclear weapons tests, and missile firings.
Several factors could influence North Korea's approach hereafter, namely:
tangible progress in U.S.-DPRK relations, the worsening domestic economy, and a
turnover in the Lee administration's DPRK policy. Regarding the first, while a
sudden advance in the nuclear weapons conflict is not foreseeable, mutual visits
by high-ranking officials and steady development in nuclear dismantlement can
improve U.S.-DPRK bilateral relations. The North's objective is not only to
obtain a security guarantee from the U.S., but also to remove barriers to
attaining economic assistance. Therefore, there is a high chance of proactive
interaction with the South after substantial progress in the denuclearization
process. North Korea may also apply pressure to South Korea by taking a more
concessive stance on the kidnapping issue and initiate talks with Japan.
Second, despite the increase in crop production this year, due to new regulations
of market activity made in an effort to revive the food distribution system,
North Korea may face mass starvation in 2009 in some areas. If distribution is
not effective and markets are debilitated, it will be challenging to supply food
for the general civilian population. I suspect that North Korea's famine is
impacted more by the government's public distribution system than by the gross
quantity of food. If Pyongyang decides to close the Kaesong complex, it is not
hard to predict a flood of complaints and grievances from the North Korean
workers and their families.
Third, the Lee administration's policy toward North Korea will have the most
impact on North Korea's outlook on the ROK. South Korea needs to encourage
Pyongyang to change its stubborn attitude.
2009 Strategic Vision
If we retain this "neglect strategy" for DPRK policy until the first half of next
year, we must not give the impression we are completely neglecting the North, and
we must continue efforts to restore inter-Korean dialogue. We must refrain from
making provocative comments and sustain the volition to achieve North-South
dialogue. At the moment, South Korea's domestic environment and continuing
international collaboration efforts are more pressing than North Korea's own
problems. If there is an incremental buildup of tension from the DPRK and the
nature of U.S.-DPRK dialogue improves after President-elect Obama steps into
office, there is a possibility that the progressive faction will criticize the
Lee administration and cause internal conflict.
In case North Korea feels the need to improve North-South relations and receives
such pressure after the first half of 2009, we must create a preparation
handbook. Especially because of the rumors of Kim Jong-il's poor health,
inter-Korean dialogue is increasingly necessary. The public may expect improved
inter-Korean relations after the first year if hostile relations with North Korea
continue.
We should offer North Korea the right incentives and rationale to step out of its
hermit state and communicate with Seoul, and insist on a plan that transforms the
character of inter-Korean negotiations. No matter what dire straits North Korea
finds itself in, there is a very small possibility that it will yield. We should
work toward realizing a method of negotiation that unites the goals of bringing
both change inside North Korea and giving humanitarian assistance. We must work
toward enforcing the monitoring of the allocation of humanitarian aid, promote
the business practices of the Kaesong industrial complex and the Mount Kumgang
tourism venture, and improve the transparency of inter-Korean businesses in
compliance with international standards.
(END)
