ID :
10887
Thu, 06/26/2008 - 11:34
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http://m.oananews.org//node/10887
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TNI CHIEF : MORE EQUAL TERMS NEEDED IN COOPERATION WITH NAMRU-2
Jakarta, June 26 (ANTARA) - Indonesian National Defense Forces (TNI) Chief Gen Djoko Santoso said the US Navy's medical research laboratory Namru-2 should be allowed to continue operating in Indonesia only if the terms in the relevant agreement were made more equal for the two countries.
Speaking at a hearing with the House of Representatives (DPR)'s Commission I (defense, foreign affairs) here Wednesday, Santoso said one of the inequalities in the present agreement was the fact that the US was represented in Namru-2 by its navy whereas the Indonesian navy was not involved in it at all.
"If the terms were equal for the two countries, the US Navy should have the TNI or the Indonesian Navy as its counterpart in Namru-2," he said.
He said so far, all that the TNI knew about Namru-2 was that it was engaged in research. However, it was possible the research results such as biological samples in the form of viruses from Indonesia, were ultimately used for medical as well as military purposes.
Since 1996, the TNI headquarters had stopped receiving official reports on Namru-2 activities either from Namru-2 itself or from the Indonesian health ministry. he said.
Another thing which was making it more difficult for Indonesia to watch over Namru-2's operations was the change in its status from detachment to command, Santoso said.
In addition, the diplomatic status given to the 23 US nationals in Namru-2 was enabling them to bring in or take out goods into or from Indonesia without inspection by Indonesian authorities and free from customs duties.
Under the old agreement, Namru-2 personnel were also free to travel in or to any part of the country, making it difficult for the Indonesian government to monitor their activities.
Santoso also said the BL-3 (Biological Safety Level-3) status enjoyed by Namru-2 had the potential of creating problems for Indonesia.
The question was that under the international convention on biological weapons, when there was an accident at a research laboratory that caused a dangerous micro-organism to escape, the host country must permit an international inspection team to check an area within a radius of 500 km from the laboratory.
"This means, if the accident happened at the Namru-2 laboratory in Jakarta, everything in Jakarta, West Java and Central Java, including military installations and vital objects in the secret category will have to be opened for inspection," he said.
Therefore, a new agreement on Namru-2 operations in Indonesia should include provisions for TNI participation in them, clear definitions of Namru-2's objects of research and areas of operations, Santoso said.
US military personnel intending to visit or operate in sensitive regions in Indonesia should also be required to ask for prior permission. The same should apply to the use of communication devices. Namru-2 must register such devices with Indonesian authorities and use frequencies determined by the Indonesian government.
The movement of Namru-2 goods into and out of the country must be subject to existing procedures in Indonesia and the US government would have to bear responsibility for any accident occurring at the Namru-2 laboratory.
Furthermore, such Indonesian government agencies as the health ministry's development and research body (Balitbangkes), the defense ministry, and the TNI's heallth center must have the right to obtain information on all of Namru-2's activities, Santoso said.
"If within a certain period of time, no accord can be reached (with the US) on inclusion of these new provisions in the agreement on Namru-2, then our suggestion to the defense minister
will be to discontinue the cooperation with Namru-2," the TNI chief said.
Speaking at a hearing with the House of Representatives (DPR)'s Commission I (defense, foreign affairs) here Wednesday, Santoso said one of the inequalities in the present agreement was the fact that the US was represented in Namru-2 by its navy whereas the Indonesian navy was not involved in it at all.
"If the terms were equal for the two countries, the US Navy should have the TNI or the Indonesian Navy as its counterpart in Namru-2," he said.
He said so far, all that the TNI knew about Namru-2 was that it was engaged in research. However, it was possible the research results such as biological samples in the form of viruses from Indonesia, were ultimately used for medical as well as military purposes.
Since 1996, the TNI headquarters had stopped receiving official reports on Namru-2 activities either from Namru-2 itself or from the Indonesian health ministry. he said.
Another thing which was making it more difficult for Indonesia to watch over Namru-2's operations was the change in its status from detachment to command, Santoso said.
In addition, the diplomatic status given to the 23 US nationals in Namru-2 was enabling them to bring in or take out goods into or from Indonesia without inspection by Indonesian authorities and free from customs duties.
Under the old agreement, Namru-2 personnel were also free to travel in or to any part of the country, making it difficult for the Indonesian government to monitor their activities.
Santoso also said the BL-3 (Biological Safety Level-3) status enjoyed by Namru-2 had the potential of creating problems for Indonesia.
The question was that under the international convention on biological weapons, when there was an accident at a research laboratory that caused a dangerous micro-organism to escape, the host country must permit an international inspection team to check an area within a radius of 500 km from the laboratory.
"This means, if the accident happened at the Namru-2 laboratory in Jakarta, everything in Jakarta, West Java and Central Java, including military installations and vital objects in the secret category will have to be opened for inspection," he said.
Therefore, a new agreement on Namru-2 operations in Indonesia should include provisions for TNI participation in them, clear definitions of Namru-2's objects of research and areas of operations, Santoso said.
US military personnel intending to visit or operate in sensitive regions in Indonesia should also be required to ask for prior permission. The same should apply to the use of communication devices. Namru-2 must register such devices with Indonesian authorities and use frequencies determined by the Indonesian government.
The movement of Namru-2 goods into and out of the country must be subject to existing procedures in Indonesia and the US government would have to bear responsibility for any accident occurring at the Namru-2 laboratory.
Furthermore, such Indonesian government agencies as the health ministry's development and research body (Balitbangkes), the defense ministry, and the TNI's heallth center must have the right to obtain information on all of Namru-2's activities, Santoso said.
"If within a certain period of time, no accord can be reached (with the US) on inclusion of these new provisions in the agreement on Namru-2, then our suggestion to the defense minister
will be to discontinue the cooperation with Namru-2," the TNI chief said.
