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108849
Sat, 02/27/2010 - 14:29
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http://m.oananews.org//node/108849
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IAEA report unbalanced: Iran
VIENNA, Feb. 27 (MNA) – In a letter to Yukiya Amano, the new International Atomic Energy Agency chief, Iran has called the recent IAEA report about its nuclear activities as unbalanced and unrealistic.
The letter was handed over to Amano by Iran’s permanent mission to the IAEA.
Following is the text of the letter obtained by the Mehr News Agency:
I- General Comments
1- The report is not balanced and factual since it has not duly reflected the explanations of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the questions of or communication made with the Agency.
2- The report has dealt with such technical details that have confused various groups of readers, diplomats, experts and the public at large.
3- The only new development since the last report by the former Director General is the successful enrichment activity up to 20% in order to produce the required fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor after Iran was disappointed due to lack of a responsible response to its legitimate request. But the lengthy text of the historical background and repeating obsolete issues such as alleged studies, so called American laptop, with details has created confusion for the public. The alleged studies, including baseless allegation on missiles, payloads and high explosives, were raised over 4 years ago, thus it is not a new issue. The Safeguards Department might have had the intention to refresh the memories of the members of the Board of Governors or to help new members at the cost of public confusion and damaging the Agency’s credibility.
4- Pursuant to the official communication by Iran of 8 February 2010 (attached) that it has decided to start enrichment activities up to 20%, Iran did only start on 9 February after the Agency officially had acknowledged the receipt of its announcement and informed Iran on the same day that the inspectors have already been instructed to be present at FEP in Natanz site on 9 February 2010.
Although the centrifuges used for this purpose were already under full scope safeguards including 24 hours surveillance of the Agency’s camera, and the routine inspection, as well as unannounced inspections, Iran however decided to inform the Agency and to invite the inspectors to be present at the time of commencement of the new activity. Therefore, the text of paragraph 11 of the report is contrary to the factual arrangement and is misleading.
5- The fact that all declared nuclear materials are accounted and are remained under the Agency full scope surveillance is not reflected in this report.
6- The fact that the material of the alleged studies lack authenticity, as declared by the former Director General, is missing in this report.
7- The report lacks any reference to the fact that United States did not permit the Agency to deliver to Iran the material related to the alleged studies, associated to the so called American laptop, thus the Agency’s verification activities were jeopardized and its credibility damaged, since the Agency was obliged to deliver the material to Iran in accordance with the Work Plan (INFCIRC/711) agreed upon with Islamic Republic of Iran. One could easily notice the criticism of the former Director General in this respect.
8- Mixing the notions of “all nuclear material”, “declared nuclear material” and the issue of “assurances of absence of undeclared nuclear materials”, in the context of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol, respectively, in a non-professional manner, has undermined the full cooperation of Iran in accordance with its CSA obligation and has misled the public.
II- SPECIFIC REMARKS:
The Report prepared by the IAEA Secretariat for the new Director General on Implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite of some deficiencies, once again confirmed Iran’s cooperation with the Agency.
The following are several examples of Iran’s cooperation which are reflected in the recent report:
A) Full-scope safeguards of the nuclear enrichment activities and materials in Natanz:
1. “The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.” (para 5)
2. “The results of the environmental samples taken at FEP as of 21 November 2009 indicate that the maximum enrichment level as declared by Iran in the relevant Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) (i.e. less than 5.0% U-235 enrichment) has not been exceeded at that plant. (para 6)
3. “Since the last report, the Agency has successfully conducted 4 unannounced inspections at FEP, making a total of 35 such inspections since March 2007. (para 6)
4. “Between 14 and 16 September 2009, the Agency conducted a PIV at the PFEP, the results of which confirmed the inventory as declared by Iran…” (para 7)
5. “On 14 February 2010, Iran, in the presence of Agency inspectors, moved approximately 1950 kg of low enriched UF6 from FEP to the PFEP feed station. (para 12)
6. “The Agency inspectors sealed the cylinder containing the material to the feed station. Iran provided the Agency with mass spectrometry results…” (para12)
B) Verification activities in Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)
7. “The Agency met with Iran between 25 and 28 October 2009, at which time it carried out design information verification (DIV) at FFEP…” (para 14) “Since 26 October 2009, the Agency has conducted five DIVs at FFEP. (para 17)
8. During three of these (five DIVs), the Agency took environmental samples.
C) Reprocessing Activities
9. The Agency has continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility. (para 18)
10. The Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at TRR on 11 November 2009, and on 23 January 2010 at the MIX Facility. There were no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities. (para 18)
D) Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)
11. “On 13 January 2010, the Agency carried out a DIV at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP). It confirmed that no new process equipment had been installed at the facility and that no new assemblies, rods or pellets had been produced since May 2009. (para 22)
E) Other areas
12. “On 8 February 2010, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 reactor at Arak. The Agency verified that the construction of the facility was ongoing.” (para 23)
13. “Under cover of a letter dated 11 February 2010, Iran submitted an updated DIQ for UCF…” (para 25)
14. “Under cover of a letter dated 13 December 2009, Iran submitted an updated DIQ for UCF which included, inter alia, the layout of the laboratory.” (para 26)
15. “On 17 January 2010, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at UCF.” (para 27)
16. “The total amount of uranium in the form of UF6 produced at UCF … remains subject to Agency containment and surveillance. (para 27)
17. “On 9 January 2010, the Agency conducted a DIV at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) in Tehran… (para 37)
The continued cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency has resulted in the conclusion that “the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran…” (para 46).
Vienna, 24 February 2010
The letter was handed over to Amano by Iran’s permanent mission to the IAEA.
Following is the text of the letter obtained by the Mehr News Agency:
I- General Comments
1- The report is not balanced and factual since it has not duly reflected the explanations of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the questions of or communication made with the Agency.
2- The report has dealt with such technical details that have confused various groups of readers, diplomats, experts and the public at large.
3- The only new development since the last report by the former Director General is the successful enrichment activity up to 20% in order to produce the required fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor after Iran was disappointed due to lack of a responsible response to its legitimate request. But the lengthy text of the historical background and repeating obsolete issues such as alleged studies, so called American laptop, with details has created confusion for the public. The alleged studies, including baseless allegation on missiles, payloads and high explosives, were raised over 4 years ago, thus it is not a new issue. The Safeguards Department might have had the intention to refresh the memories of the members of the Board of Governors or to help new members at the cost of public confusion and damaging the Agency’s credibility.
4- Pursuant to the official communication by Iran of 8 February 2010 (attached) that it has decided to start enrichment activities up to 20%, Iran did only start on 9 February after the Agency officially had acknowledged the receipt of its announcement and informed Iran on the same day that the inspectors have already been instructed to be present at FEP in Natanz site on 9 February 2010.
Although the centrifuges used for this purpose were already under full scope safeguards including 24 hours surveillance of the Agency’s camera, and the routine inspection, as well as unannounced inspections, Iran however decided to inform the Agency and to invite the inspectors to be present at the time of commencement of the new activity. Therefore, the text of paragraph 11 of the report is contrary to the factual arrangement and is misleading.
5- The fact that all declared nuclear materials are accounted and are remained under the Agency full scope surveillance is not reflected in this report.
6- The fact that the material of the alleged studies lack authenticity, as declared by the former Director General, is missing in this report.
7- The report lacks any reference to the fact that United States did not permit the Agency to deliver to Iran the material related to the alleged studies, associated to the so called American laptop, thus the Agency’s verification activities were jeopardized and its credibility damaged, since the Agency was obliged to deliver the material to Iran in accordance with the Work Plan (INFCIRC/711) agreed upon with Islamic Republic of Iran. One could easily notice the criticism of the former Director General in this respect.
8- Mixing the notions of “all nuclear material”, “declared nuclear material” and the issue of “assurances of absence of undeclared nuclear materials”, in the context of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol, respectively, in a non-professional manner, has undermined the full cooperation of Iran in accordance with its CSA obligation and has misled the public.
II- SPECIFIC REMARKS:
The Report prepared by the IAEA Secretariat for the new Director General on Implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite of some deficiencies, once again confirmed Iran’s cooperation with the Agency.
The following are several examples of Iran’s cooperation which are reflected in the recent report:
A) Full-scope safeguards of the nuclear enrichment activities and materials in Natanz:
1. “The nuclear material at FEP (including the feed, product and tails), as well as all installed cascades and the feed and withdrawal stations, are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.” (para 5)
2. “The results of the environmental samples taken at FEP as of 21 November 2009 indicate that the maximum enrichment level as declared by Iran in the relevant Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) (i.e. less than 5.0% U-235 enrichment) has not been exceeded at that plant. (para 6)
3. “Since the last report, the Agency has successfully conducted 4 unannounced inspections at FEP, making a total of 35 such inspections since March 2007. (para 6)
4. “Between 14 and 16 September 2009, the Agency conducted a PIV at the PFEP, the results of which confirmed the inventory as declared by Iran…” (para 7)
5. “On 14 February 2010, Iran, in the presence of Agency inspectors, moved approximately 1950 kg of low enriched UF6 from FEP to the PFEP feed station. (para 12)
6. “The Agency inspectors sealed the cylinder containing the material to the feed station. Iran provided the Agency with mass spectrometry results…” (para12)
B) Verification activities in Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)
7. “The Agency met with Iran between 25 and 28 October 2009, at which time it carried out design information verification (DIV) at FFEP…” (para 14) “Since 26 October 2009, the Agency has conducted five DIVs at FFEP. (para 17)
8. During three of these (five DIVs), the Agency took environmental samples.
C) Reprocessing Activities
9. The Agency has continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility. (para 18)
10. The Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at TRR on 11 November 2009, and on 23 January 2010 at the MIX Facility. There were no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities. (para 18)
D) Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)
11. “On 13 January 2010, the Agency carried out a DIV at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP). It confirmed that no new process equipment had been installed at the facility and that no new assemblies, rods or pellets had been produced since May 2009. (para 22)
E) Other areas
12. “On 8 February 2010, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 reactor at Arak. The Agency verified that the construction of the facility was ongoing.” (para 23)
13. “Under cover of a letter dated 11 February 2010, Iran submitted an updated DIQ for UCF…” (para 25)
14. “Under cover of a letter dated 13 December 2009, Iran submitted an updated DIQ for UCF which included, inter alia, the layout of the laboratory.” (para 26)
15. “On 17 January 2010, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at UCF.” (para 27)
16. “The total amount of uranium in the form of UF6 produced at UCF … remains subject to Agency containment and surveillance. (para 27)
17. “On 9 January 2010, the Agency conducted a DIV at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) in Tehran… (para 37)
The continued cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Agency has resulted in the conclusion that “the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran…” (para 46).
Vienna, 24 February 2010
