ID :
18000
Thu, 09/04/2008 - 13:11
Auther :
Shortlink :
http://m.oananews.org//node/18000
The shortlink copeid
N-fuel assurance not to 'insulate' India against nuke-test: US
Washington, Sept.3 (PTI) In curiously-timed disclosures,
the US has made it clear that its assurances of nuclear fuel
supplies to India are not meant to "insulate" it against the
consequences of a nuclear test.
A day ahead of the meeting of the 45-nation Nuclear
Suppliers Group (N.S.G.) in Vienna where the fate of the
controversial Indo-US nuclear deal is expected to be decided,
the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Howard
Berman has released State Department's anwsers to 45 questions
on the deal which indicate clearly differing perceptions on
key issues between New Delhi and Washington.
The questions were submitted to the State Department by
Berman's predecessor Tom Lantos way back in October last year
and anwsers were sent on January 16 this year. For nine
months, these documents were kept under wraps and have been
made public just before the Vienna meeting.
The answers were considered "so sensitive, particularly
because the debate over the agreement in India could have
toppled the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that
the State Department requested they remain secret even though
they were not classified," according to Washington Post which
quoted a Spokesman for Berman as saying he had made the
anwsers public because the US Congress must have "relevant
information".
Berman recently wrote a letter to the US Secretary of
State Condoleeza Rice in which he threatened that the deal
will be blocked in the US Congress if the Bush Administration
does not incorporate additional conditionalties in any N.S.G.
waiver to India.
In its responses, the State Department has said that as
outlined in the 123 Agreement, should India detonate a nuclear
explosive device, the US has the right to cease all nuclear
cooperation with it immediately, including the supply of fuel.
It also stipulates that US can request India to return
items transferred from it including fresh fuel. In addition,
the US has the right to termiante the agreement on one year's
written notice.
The State Department letter says the US assurances are
intended to guard against disruptions of fuel supply to India
that might occur through no fault of its own. It cited
instances like a trade war resulting in the cut off supply,
market disruptions or the failure of a company to fulfill a
fuel supply contract.
In such circumstances, the US would be prepared to
encourage transfers of nuclear fuel to India by other N.S.G.
members.
"The fuel supply assurances are not, however, meant to
insulate India against the consequences of a nuclear explosive
test or a violation of non-proliferation commitments," the
State Department said.
The State Department also took the line that ceasing
nuclear coopeation with India would be a "serious step."
"The US would not take such a serious step without
careful consideration of the circumstances necessitating such
actions and the effects and impacts it would entail," it said.
Such circumstances would include detonation of a nuclear
weapon, violation of the 123 Agreement or termination,
abrogation or violation of the I.A.E.A. safeguards.
The State Department contended that although the Hyde Act
allows for transfers of sensitive nuclear technology under
certain circumstances, it was not the intention of the
Administration to do this "outside" the deal.
It insisted that there was no plan or intention to
negotiate an amendment to the proposed agreement to transfer
to India sensitive nuclear facilities or critical components
of such facilities.
The Department was asked whether US would limit any
transfer of dual use technology to India's enrichment and
reprocessing facilities to those that were participants in a
bilateral or multinational programme to develop
proliferation-resistant fuel cycle technologies.
In its response, the Administration said it was not its
intention to assist India in the design, construction or
operation of sensitive nuclear technologies through the
transfer of dual-use items "whether under the agreement or
outside the agreement."
If India were to develop such facilities, potential
dual-use transfers could be considered only under the
exceptions granted in the Hyde Act, it said.
It said the US has not discussed in detail with India
what form "appropriate verfication measures" might take if the
I.A.E.A. decides that it was no longer possible for it to
apply safeguards under the Indo-US agreeemnt. (MORE) PTI VMN
the US has made it clear that its assurances of nuclear fuel
supplies to India are not meant to "insulate" it against the
consequences of a nuclear test.
A day ahead of the meeting of the 45-nation Nuclear
Suppliers Group (N.S.G.) in Vienna where the fate of the
controversial Indo-US nuclear deal is expected to be decided,
the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Howard
Berman has released State Department's anwsers to 45 questions
on the deal which indicate clearly differing perceptions on
key issues between New Delhi and Washington.
The questions were submitted to the State Department by
Berman's predecessor Tom Lantos way back in October last year
and anwsers were sent on January 16 this year. For nine
months, these documents were kept under wraps and have been
made public just before the Vienna meeting.
The answers were considered "so sensitive, particularly
because the debate over the agreement in India could have
toppled the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that
the State Department requested they remain secret even though
they were not classified," according to Washington Post which
quoted a Spokesman for Berman as saying he had made the
anwsers public because the US Congress must have "relevant
information".
Berman recently wrote a letter to the US Secretary of
State Condoleeza Rice in which he threatened that the deal
will be blocked in the US Congress if the Bush Administration
does not incorporate additional conditionalties in any N.S.G.
waiver to India.
In its responses, the State Department has said that as
outlined in the 123 Agreement, should India detonate a nuclear
explosive device, the US has the right to cease all nuclear
cooperation with it immediately, including the supply of fuel.
It also stipulates that US can request India to return
items transferred from it including fresh fuel. In addition,
the US has the right to termiante the agreement on one year's
written notice.
The State Department letter says the US assurances are
intended to guard against disruptions of fuel supply to India
that might occur through no fault of its own. It cited
instances like a trade war resulting in the cut off supply,
market disruptions or the failure of a company to fulfill a
fuel supply contract.
In such circumstances, the US would be prepared to
encourage transfers of nuclear fuel to India by other N.S.G.
members.
"The fuel supply assurances are not, however, meant to
insulate India against the consequences of a nuclear explosive
test or a violation of non-proliferation commitments," the
State Department said.
The State Department also took the line that ceasing
nuclear coopeation with India would be a "serious step."
"The US would not take such a serious step without
careful consideration of the circumstances necessitating such
actions and the effects and impacts it would entail," it said.
Such circumstances would include detonation of a nuclear
weapon, violation of the 123 Agreement or termination,
abrogation or violation of the I.A.E.A. safeguards.
The State Department contended that although the Hyde Act
allows for transfers of sensitive nuclear technology under
certain circumstances, it was not the intention of the
Administration to do this "outside" the deal.
It insisted that there was no plan or intention to
negotiate an amendment to the proposed agreement to transfer
to India sensitive nuclear facilities or critical components
of such facilities.
The Department was asked whether US would limit any
transfer of dual use technology to India's enrichment and
reprocessing facilities to those that were participants in a
bilateral or multinational programme to develop
proliferation-resistant fuel cycle technologies.
In its response, the Administration said it was not its
intention to assist India in the design, construction or
operation of sensitive nuclear technologies through the
transfer of dual-use items "whether under the agreement or
outside the agreement."
If India were to develop such facilities, potential
dual-use transfers could be considered only under the
exceptions granted in the Hyde Act, it said.
It said the US has not discussed in detail with India
what form "appropriate verfication measures" might take if the
I.A.E.A. decides that it was no longer possible for it to
apply safeguards under the Indo-US agreeemnt. (MORE) PTI VMN
