ID :
17807
Tue, 09/02/2008 - 18:41
Auther :
Shortlink :
http://m.oananews.org//node/17807
The shortlink copeid
N Deal: ACA asks NSG to reject India-specific exemption draft
Washington, Sept 2 (PTI) An prominent arms control
organisation has asked the Nuclear Supplier Group (N.S.G.) to
reject the revised draft, that exempts India from its certain
guidelines for nuclear trade, as it does not contains any
meaningful adjustments.
On the eve of the crucial meeting of the 45-member
N.S.G., the Executive Director of the Arms Control
Association, Daryl Kimball argued that "the revised proposal
does not incorporate any meaningful adjustments or concessions
and is essentially the same as the earlier draft proposal."
Kimball pointed out to a paragraph in the revised draft
that says that all governments participating in the N.S.G.
shall inform each other on what bilateral cooperation they are
pursuing with India, after the exemption is approved.
"This would be mildly useful ahead of an N.S.G.
decision,but does not hold India accountable to any
non-proliferation or disarmament commitments," Kimball said in
an e-mail, going on to point out to yet another paragraph that
says participating Governments can call an extraordinary
consultation within the N.S.G. on India "should circumstances
require it."
"This is being characterized as a response to several
proposals from N.S.G. states for a regular review mechanism
for nuclear trade with India. But in reality, this does not do
anything more than what is already in the N.S.G. guidelines
under (paragraph 16) that allows for a special meeting of
N.S.G. states in the event of extraordinary events, including
a nuclear test(s)," the senior arms control expert has
maintained.
He asked the N.S.G. members to "flatly reject the
proposal and N.S.G. states should insist on the conditions and
restrictions outlined in the August 15 experts and N.G.O.s
letter."
Kimball recommends that if N.S.G. states agrees to supply
nuclear fuel to India, "then all nuclear cooperation with
India involving N.S.G. members shall be terminated and unused
fuel supplies from N.S.G. states shall be returned, if it
(India) resumes nuclear testing, or it violates safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(I.A.E.A.) or withdraws 'civilian' facilities or materials
from international safeguards.
"N.S.G. states should expressly prohibit any transfer of
sensitive plutonium reprocessing, uranium enrichment, or heavy
water production items to India, whether inside or outside
bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, and supply the fuel
in a manner that commensurate with ordinary reactor operating
requirements and not provide – individually or collectively –
strategic or lifetime nuclear fuel reserves," he said.
He asked N.S.G. states to actively oppose any arrangement
that would give India any special safeguards exemptions or
would in any way be inconsistent with the principle of
permanent and unconditional safeguards over all nuclear
materials and facilities subject to its safeguards agreement
with the I.A.E.A.
"Before India is granted a waiver from the N.S.G.'s
full-scope safeguards standard, it should join the other
original nuclear weapon states by declaring it has stopped
fissile material production for weapons purposes and
transform its nuclear test moratorium into a meaningful,
legally-binding commitment," Kimball said.
The arms expert maintained that the N.S.G. states should
agree not to grant India consent to reprocess nuclear fuel
supplied by an NSG member state in a facility that is not
under permanent and unconditional I.A.E.A. safeguards.
Also not to agree that any material produced in other
facilities may not be transferred to any unsafeguarded
facility and that NSG states should agree that all bilateral
nuclear cooperation agreements between an N.S.G. member state
and India explicitly prohibit the replication or use of such
technology in any unsafeguarded Indian facilities.
"The Indian nuclear deal would be a non-proliferation
disaster and a serious setback to the prospects of global
nuclear disarmament, especially now," the A.C.A. official has
said.
"More than just six states are ppposed to a 'Clean' or
'Unconditional' waiver. It has been widely reported that a
group of six like-minded states (Austria, Ireland, New
Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland) have put
forward proposals for restrictions, conditions, and a review
mechanism for nuclear trade with India, but the group of
states backing these ideas is actually far larger, probably
around 15 total," Kimball maintained.
"These include Japan, several other northern European
states, and possibly China. The commentary yesterday in
China's official People's Daily calls the India deal a "major
blow" to non-proliferation, raising possibility that China is
unhappy with the proposed US waiver for India," he added.
organisation has asked the Nuclear Supplier Group (N.S.G.) to
reject the revised draft, that exempts India from its certain
guidelines for nuclear trade, as it does not contains any
meaningful adjustments.
On the eve of the crucial meeting of the 45-member
N.S.G., the Executive Director of the Arms Control
Association, Daryl Kimball argued that "the revised proposal
does not incorporate any meaningful adjustments or concessions
and is essentially the same as the earlier draft proposal."
Kimball pointed out to a paragraph in the revised draft
that says that all governments participating in the N.S.G.
shall inform each other on what bilateral cooperation they are
pursuing with India, after the exemption is approved.
"This would be mildly useful ahead of an N.S.G.
decision,but does not hold India accountable to any
non-proliferation or disarmament commitments," Kimball said in
an e-mail, going on to point out to yet another paragraph that
says participating Governments can call an extraordinary
consultation within the N.S.G. on India "should circumstances
require it."
"This is being characterized as a response to several
proposals from N.S.G. states for a regular review mechanism
for nuclear trade with India. But in reality, this does not do
anything more than what is already in the N.S.G. guidelines
under (paragraph 16) that allows for a special meeting of
N.S.G. states in the event of extraordinary events, including
a nuclear test(s)," the senior arms control expert has
maintained.
He asked the N.S.G. members to "flatly reject the
proposal and N.S.G. states should insist on the conditions and
restrictions outlined in the August 15 experts and N.G.O.s
letter."
Kimball recommends that if N.S.G. states agrees to supply
nuclear fuel to India, "then all nuclear cooperation with
India involving N.S.G. members shall be terminated and unused
fuel supplies from N.S.G. states shall be returned, if it
(India) resumes nuclear testing, or it violates safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(I.A.E.A.) or withdraws 'civilian' facilities or materials
from international safeguards.
"N.S.G. states should expressly prohibit any transfer of
sensitive plutonium reprocessing, uranium enrichment, or heavy
water production items to India, whether inside or outside
bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, and supply the fuel
in a manner that commensurate with ordinary reactor operating
requirements and not provide – individually or collectively –
strategic or lifetime nuclear fuel reserves," he said.
He asked N.S.G. states to actively oppose any arrangement
that would give India any special safeguards exemptions or
would in any way be inconsistent with the principle of
permanent and unconditional safeguards over all nuclear
materials and facilities subject to its safeguards agreement
with the I.A.E.A.
"Before India is granted a waiver from the N.S.G.'s
full-scope safeguards standard, it should join the other
original nuclear weapon states by declaring it has stopped
fissile material production for weapons purposes and
transform its nuclear test moratorium into a meaningful,
legally-binding commitment," Kimball said.
The arms expert maintained that the N.S.G. states should
agree not to grant India consent to reprocess nuclear fuel
supplied by an NSG member state in a facility that is not
under permanent and unconditional I.A.E.A. safeguards.
Also not to agree that any material produced in other
facilities may not be transferred to any unsafeguarded
facility and that NSG states should agree that all bilateral
nuclear cooperation agreements between an N.S.G. member state
and India explicitly prohibit the replication or use of such
technology in any unsafeguarded Indian facilities.
"The Indian nuclear deal would be a non-proliferation
disaster and a serious setback to the prospects of global
nuclear disarmament, especially now," the A.C.A. official has
said.
"More than just six states are ppposed to a 'Clean' or
'Unconditional' waiver. It has been widely reported that a
group of six like-minded states (Austria, Ireland, New
Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland) have put
forward proposals for restrictions, conditions, and a review
mechanism for nuclear trade with India, but the group of
states backing these ideas is actually far larger, probably
around 15 total," Kimball maintained.
"These include Japan, several other northern European
states, and possibly China. The commentary yesterday in
China's official People's Daily calls the India deal a "major
blow" to non-proliferation, raising possibility that China is
unhappy with the proposed US waiver for India," he added.